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Abstract 
Security and requirements engineering are two of the most important factors of success in the 
development of a software product line (SPL) due to the complexity and extensive nature of them, 
given that a weakness in security can cause problems throughout the products of a product line. 
Goal-driven security requirements engineering approaches, such as Secure Tropos, have been 
proposed in the literature as a suitable paradigm for elicitation of security requirements and their 
analysis on both a social and a technical dimension. Nevertheless, on one hand, goal-driven 
security requirements engineering methodologies are not appropriately tailored to the specific 
demands of SPL, while on the other hand specific proposals of SPL engineering have traditionally 
ignored security requirements. This paper presents work that fills this gap by proposing 
“SecureTropos-SPL” framework, an extension to Secure Tropos to support SPL security 
requirements engineering which is based on security goals and driven by security risks. 
Keywords: Security requirements, product lines, requirements engineering, security requirement 
engineering, Secure Tropos. 
1. Introduction 
Information systems undoubtedly play an important role in today’s society and 
more and more are at the heart of critical infrastructures. It is widely accepted in 
the security research literature [14], that security is of particular importance to 
such information systems and that is essential for security to be considered from 
the early stages of software development for an effective management of security 
issues. Although security is traditionally considered a technical issue; security is, 
in fact, a two-dimensional problem, which involves technical as well as social 
challenges [18]. 
At the same time, in recent years, many public and private organizations are 
making the strategic decision to adopt a software product line (SPL) approach to 
the production of software-intensive systems [13]. Since SPL strategy has proven 
successful at reducing both time-to-market and development costs [4, 6] and 
obtaining both high-quality information systems and higher productivity [13]. The 
SPL development paradigm is based on increasing the reuse of all types of 
artefacts, thanks to the combination of coarse-grained components with a top-
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down systematic approach in which software components are integrated into a 
high-level structure. 
Proper analysis and understanding of security requirements are important 
because they help us to discover any security or requirement defects or mistakes 
in the early stages of development, in fact the long-standing credo of requirements 
engineering reads: ‘‘If you don’t know what you want, it’s hard to do it right’’ [7]. 
In SPL development it is even more important given that a weakness in security 
owing to a mistake in a security requirement can cause problems throughout the 
products of a product line. Therefore, the elicitation of security requirements for 
SPL is a challenging task, mainly due to the varying security properties required 
in different products, for the diversity of market segments, and the constraint of 
simultaneously maintaining the cost-effective principle of the SPL paradigm. 
Nevertheless, there is lack of approaches in the security requirements literature 
[14], which would support the elicitation and analysis of both social and technical 
security requirements from the early stages of the SPL development process. On 
one hand current SPL approaches which include partial support for security 
requirements engineering do not manage both dimensions of security (social and 
technical dimension); on the other hand, proposals that manage both the technical 
and the social dimensions of security (such as Secure Tropos) are not tailored 
enough to support the SPL development paradigm. 
In this paper, we propose SecureTropos-SPL, an extension of some stages of 
Secure Tropos [17] methodology to fill this gap. Our work initially aligns SPL 
concepts to Secure Tropos concepts, and secondly it redefines the Secure Tropos 
process, so that we proposed a risk-driven goal-based process to manage security 
requirements variability at both Early Requirements and Late Requirements stages 
of Secure Tropos in SPL development. Finally, it is proposed the extension of 
Secure Tropos metamodel and language to support security risks and SPL 
concepts such as ‘variability’ and its modeling, that is SPL modeling with Secure 
Tropos, in order to manage at the same time both the technical and the social 
dimensions of SPL security and also taking into account the security risks. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background 
information about Secure Tropos and SPL needed for a better understanding of 
the proposal. In Section 3 it is sum up the related work. Section 4 outlines the core 
elements of SecureTropos-SPL, our proposed extensions to Secure Tropos, while 
Section 5 illustrates with the aid of an example the applicability of these 
extensions to Secure Tropos. Finally, Section 6 discusses contributions and future 
work.  
2. Secure Tropos and Software Product Lines 
Requirements Engineering Basics 
2.1. Overview of Secure Tropos 
Secure Tropos [17] is a security-oriented extension of the widely known 
requirements engineering methodology Tropos [5]. It introduces a number of 
security-related concepts to the Tropos methodology. Tropos (and as a result 
Secure Tropos) methodology is mainly based on four stages:  
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• Early requirements analysis aimed at defining and understanding a 
problem by studying its existing organizational setting.  
• Late requirements analysis conceived to define the system-to-be in the 
context of its operational environment. 
• Architectural design, that deals with the definition of the system global 
architecture in terms of subsystems; and the 
• Detailed design phase, aimed at specifying each architectural 
component in further detail, in terms of inputs, outputs, control and 
other relevant information. 
The main unique points of the methodology compared to other security 
oriented software engineering approaches are that  
• social issues of security are analyzed during the early requirements 
stage; 
• security is considered simultaneously with the other requirements of the 
system-to-be; and 
• the methodology supports not only requirements stages but also design 
stages. 
In this paper we will extend Secure Tropos in order to to manage security 
requirements variability at both Early Requirements and Late Requirements stages 
of Secure Tropos in SPL development 
2.2. Software Product Lines Requirements Engineering Basics 
A software product line (SPL) is a set of software-intensive systems sharing a 
common, managed set of features [10] which satisfy the specific needs of a 
particular market segment or mission and which is developed from a common set 
of core assets in a prescribed way [6]. Exploiting commonalities between different 
systems is at the heart of Software Product Line Engineering. These 
commonalities and differences are described by using the core concept in 
Software Product Line Engineering: variability. Variability describes the 
variations in both functional and non-functional features in the product line. 
Features are either a commonality or a variation. Variability management is the 
activity in product line development that aims to model a product line as a whole 
and to customize or change specific product line members. Its importance 
signifies that it can actually be seen as the key feature that distinguishes product 
line development from other approaches to software development [23]. In 
common language use the term variability refers to the ability or the tendency to 
change, but in this case this change does not occur by chance but is brought about 
deliberately. For example: an electric bulb can be lit or unlit, or a software 
application can support different languages. Variability in SPL is therefore 
variability that is modelled to enable the development of customised applications 
by reusing predefined, adjustable artefacts. The variability of a SPL thus 
distinguishes different applications of the product line. In contrast to variability, 
the commonality in SPL denotes features that are part of each application in 
exactly the same form. This means that it is often possible to decide whether a 
feature is a variable of the SPL or whether it is common to all software product 
applications, and thus adds to the commonality. 
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The software product line engineering paradigm differentiates two processes: 
domain engineering and application engineering [21]. Domain engineering is the 
process of SPL engineering in which commonality and variability of the product 
line are defined and carried out. According to [21] the domain requirements 
engineering sub-process encompasses all activities for eliciting and documenting 
the common and variable requirements of the product line. Application 
engineering is the process of SPL engineering in which the applications of the 
product line are built by reusing domain artefacts and exploiting product line 
variability. Product line requirements define the products and their common and 
variable features in the product line. Requirements that are common to the entire 
family, which constitute the product line requirements and an important core 
asset, should be managed separately from requirements that are particular to a 
subset of the products (or to a single product), which must also be managed. The 
SPL scope binds the products included in the product line: product line 
requirements refine the scope by more precisely defining the characteristics of the 
products in the product line. Both concepts are closely coupled and evolve 
together [6]. 
3. Related Work 
Several attempts have also recently been made to define SPL architectures for 
security, such as the approach of Faegri et al. [8] and the approach of Arciniegas 
et al. [1], although their work is focused on tackling security management in SPL 
engineering, their approach is applicable to the latest stages of the development 
process rather than security requirements, because are more orientated towards the 
software solution than to security requirements elicitation and definition or 
include only a few security requirements tasks, but without managing all the 
security requirements artefacts (assets, threats, etc.). The Security Requirements 
Engineering Process for Software Product Lines (SREPPLine) [15] has been 
recently proposed to support security requirements analysis for SPL. However, 
SREPPLine fails to consider both the social and technical dimensions of security 
and it also does not support the parallel modelling of security requirements and 
the rest of the security elements and their variability with a homogeneous 
modelling language, as our approach does. 
The most relevant “generic” security requirements related proposals were 
systematically reviewed in [14] (Secure Tropos included). Thanks to this review 
that we have already done, it can be observed that these proposals are neither 
sufficiently specific nor are they tailored to the SPL development paradigm, 
principally because they do not deal with security requirements variability, which 
is an essential aspect. Moreover, they do not provide a methodological tailored 
approach for SPL engineering, that is, they do not have specific activities nor 
language to manage the security variability needed by the SPL development 
paradigm. Therefore, they are not appropriate enough to manage security 
requirements in SPL, as it was also explained in [15]. 
Having said this, each of these approaches makes highly important 
contributions to security requirements engineering in SPL. In addition, some of 
their features are used as the basis of our proposal. 
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4. SecureTropos-SPL: Secure Tropos Framework for 
Software Product Lines 
In this section, we present the major principles of our proposal. Firstly, we 
outline the core of our approach. Next we align SPL concepts to Secure Tropos 
concepts, and then it is redefined the Secure Tropos process at both Early 
Requirements and Late Requirements phases of Secure Tropos. Finally, it is 
proposed an extension of Secure Tropos language in order to deal with the 
variability needed for SPL engineering and to manage security risks elements. 
4.1. Overview of our approach 
Our approach ‘Secure Tropos – SPL’, as shown in Fig. 1, is based on Secure 
Tropos and therefore on Tropos methodology. We propose an extension to Secure 
Tropos to support SPL security requirements engineering based on security goals 
and driven by security risks. 
The aim of our approach is to minimize both knowledge of the necessary 
security and risks concepts and security expert participation during SPL product 
development, so that this approach provides support for the elicitation and 
analysis of both social and technical security requirements following security risks 
criterion from the early stages of the SPL development process. 
Consequently, we aligned concepts of Goal Driven SPL Engineering with 
Secure Tropos concepts. Furthermore, we have redefined Secure Tropos process 
by means of introducing new tasks which deal with the variability of the security 
requirements, as well as we have specified these new tasks and activities of the 
process using the OMG standard SPEM 2.0 [20]. As shown in Fig. 1, we have 
integrated the Domain and Application Requirements Engineering activities in 
both the Early and Late Requirements stages, as well as we suggested a new task 
‘Variability Analysis’ which is carried out during Domain Requirements 
Engineering Activity in order to manage the variability of SPL, so that the 
common and variable security goals are identified and modelled. We have also 
proposed two new tasks: ‘Variability Instantiation’ and ‘Sec-deltas Analysis’, 
which are performed in Application Requirements Engineering Activity and in 
these tasks the set of domain security goals are instantiated as well as it is 
analyzed and modelled the security specific requirements of the application. 
Moreover, we introduced security risk related tasks based on security 
requirements management approaches (such as Magerit [12], methodology 
officially recognised by NATO at the 9th NATO cyberdefense workshop in 2008 
and by OECD [19]) with the aim of introducing risk criterion in the security 
requirements elicitation, so that our approach not only consider both the social 
and technical dimensions of security it also does take into account the security 
risk in SPL engineering. Moreover, our final aim is also to align the work with 
relevant “industrial” standards or guidelines (as for example Magerit, …) and 
methods to drive the use of the work in industry. 
In Fig. 1 we have outlined the main components of our proposed framework as 
a high level abstraction diagram of components. In the left side of the figure, it is 
depicted how our framework fits in the SPL development paradigm and in the 
requirements engineering methodology Tropos [5]. In the top of the figure, we 
have sum up the key languages, tools or techniques that our framework is based 
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on, such as SPEM 2.0 to specify the process, SecTroModellingTool to model 
according Secure Tropos specification, and security risk assessment approaches 
(as Magerit, CRAMM or Octave, etc.). In the bottom of the figure, it is shown the 
extension of Secure Tropos metamodel and language as it is explained next as a 
subsection, so that we have added new entities and relationships to support 
variability and risk elements in two sub-parts of the Secure Tropos modetamodel 
related to the Security Enhanced Actor Model (SEAM) and Security Enhanced 
Goal Model (SEGM). Finally, in the centre of the figure, we represent the core 
activities of the process proposed in our framework. 
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4.2. Aligning Secure Tropos with SPL concepts 
One of the first challenges we faced, was the alignment between Secure Tropos 
concepts and SPL concepts. Firstly, we had to introduce the concept of variability 
Fig. 1 Secure Tropos - SPL overview 
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in Secure Tropos, due to the fact that variability management is at the heart of the 
SPL paradigm.  
Secure Tropos is a goal driven security requirements engineering methodology, 
in which a goal represents actors’ strategic interests and a secure goal represents 
the strategic interests of an actor with respect to security. Secure goals are mainly 
introduced to achieve possible security constraints that are imposed to an actor or 
exist in the system. An actor is defined as an entity that has strategic goal. In 
Secure Tropos security constraints define the system’s security requirements; they 
are security conditions imposed to an actor that restricts achievement of an actor’s 
goals, execution of plans or availability of resources. In addition, Secure Tropos 
defines secure dependencies. A secure dependency introduces security 
constraint(s) that must be fulfilled for the dependency to be satisfied. 
In SPL engineering (but above all in goal driven SPL engineering), since a goal 
could provide the rationale for variations in domain requirements [11], we used it 
as a discriminator that enables us to identify common and variant goals and hence 
secure goals in Secure Tropos. Thus, the common (default option), optional and/or 
alternative goals in SPL can be modeled in Secure Tropos by means of a 
Variability Dependency relationship (a new relationship of Secure Tropos 
explained in next subsection 4.3 and shown in [16]). 
Moreover, in Secure Tropos, the precise definition of how a secure goal can be 
achieved is given by a secure plan, which is defined as a particular way for 
satisfying a secure goal. Usually, a secure plan or goal needs a secure resource, 
which is an informational entity that is needed for the achievement of a secure 
goal or the fulfilment of a secure plan. Therefore, these entities of Secure Tropos 
(security constraint, secure plan, secure resource) could be part of variants of a 
SPL because they are related to goals and secure goals which are variations of a 
SPL, so that they are modeled by means of a variability dependency relationship 
between them and an actor, by means of the ‘Variation’ entity (a new entity of 
Secure Tropos explained in next subsection 4.3 and shown in[16]). 
We have also had to partially adapt the concept of actor of Secure Tropos, so 
that a SPL is a special type of a general actor and so as to during Application 
Engineering in SPL the different products/applications instantiated from the SPL 
are modeled as actors that reuse from the SPL-actor the domain common 
requirements, but also each application of the SPL will model their security 
specific requirements (security requirements are security related restrictions to the 
functionalities of the system) or each application will model the sec-deltas [15]. 
Sec-deltas occur when stakeholder security requirements cannot be completely 
satisfied by security domain requirements artefacts. 
A second challenge was to integrate the two main activities related to 
requirements engineering in SPL engineering with Secure Tropos process (which 
is more detailed in next subsection 4.4). According to the definitions of these 
activities (previously explained in Section 2), and taking into account the 
development stages of Secure Tropos, we have integrated the Domain and 
Application Requirements Engineering activities in both the Early and Late 
requirements stages, although in Application Requirements Engineering activity 
during the Early Requirements stage it will only be done the inheritance of the 
common requirements of the SPL. That is, for the development of a SPL during 
the Domain Requirements Engineering activity we will carry out Early and Late 
requirements stages analyses, initially by defining and understanding the SPL 
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settings and then by defining the SPL-to-be in the context of its operational 
environment (modeling common, alternative and optional entities). While for the 
instantiation of the products/applications of the SPL during the Application 
Requirements Engineering activity we will inherit the early requirements from the 
SPL. Thus, during Application Engineering it will only be needed to carry out the 
Late Requirements Engineering stage of Secure Tropos, because is in this stage 
when each instantiated product/application from the SPL is defined, in the context 
of its operational environment, and when sec-deltas will be modeled.  
Therefore, through the above discussed alignments and adaptations of concepts 
as well as the extensions of part of the Secure Tropos metamodel related to. 
Security Enhanced Actor Diagram (SEAD) and Security Enhanced Goal Diagram 
(SEGD) (explained in more detail in following subsection 4.3), we are able to 
capture and model security, with Secure Tropos, the security requirements of a 
SPL along with the variability of their related entities. 
4.3. Secure Tropos Metamodel and Language Extension 
Most existing variability management approaches in SPL, such as, for 
example: [2, 22, 24] are focused on addressing functional requirements variability 
and they do not manage the technical and the social dimensions of security of 
SPL. Hence, in this work with the aim of filling this gap, we are interested in two 
sub-parts of the Secure Tropos metamodel related to the Security Enhanced Actor 
Model (SEAM) and Security Enhanced Goal Model (SEGM), so that we have 
extended these parts of the metamodel in order to provide support to the 
variability management (which is the core of SPL engineering) in Secure Tropos 
metamodel as well as to the security risk assessment from the early stages of SPL 
development. 
The SEAM defines a set of actors along with their secure dependencies and 
any security constraints that might be imposed to these actors. The SEGM assists 
to analyse the security issues of a particular Actor by understanding the 
implications that Security Constraints, identified in SEAM, have in that particular 
actor. 
The extension to SEAM is shown in Fig.  2. We have added the ‘Variability 
Dependency’ relationship, which inherits from ‘Dependency’ and from which 
‘Secure Dependency’ inherits, so that variability of Dependum entities could be 
modelled. Furthermore, through the attribute ‘Depender’ or ‘Dependee’, 
developers can specify the “owner” of the variant. Secure Dependency 
relationships are ‘Common’ variants by default. Hence, through this new 
‘Variability Dependency’ relationship it is possible to state variability 
dependencies between all the entities supported by Tropos (i.e. goals, plans, 
actors, resources, and security constraints) and specify if they are ‘common’ 
(default), ‘optional’ or ‘alternative’ variability relationships. Nevertheless, the 
variability of the entities will start from the identification and specification of the 
goals variability, as it is the core of the variability because our framework is a 
goal-driven one. 
Furthermore, we have inserted the ‘Asset value’ as an attribute of the ‘Security 
Constraint’, ‘Plan’, ‘Goal’ and ‘Resource’ elements in order to record the value 
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of the business and system / SPL assets
1
 following a standardized scale from 0 to 
10 in accordance with the Magerit [12] risk assessment methodology and agreed 
with the stakeholders. Through this new attribute ‘Asset value’ in the ‘Secure’ 
elements it is possible that each asset has a ‘value’ according to his related goal 
and/or secure goal. We based our asset analysis on the definition of an asset as 
anything that has value to the organization [9], that is, these assets are the 
resources in the information systems of the SPL, or these which are related to 
them which are necessary for the organization to operate correctly and to achieve 
its goals (both tangible or intangible). Thus, as we had identified that in Secure 
Tropos the entities: plan, resource, goal and actor; are used to model both 
business and systems/SPL assets. There could also be different standardized 
categories of assets (such as the environment, information systems, services, 
components and information or data) to make easier and more systematic the 
assets valuation. Dependencies between assets could also exist, so that valuations 
are propagated through the dependency tree of assets and therefore only the higher 
assets in the dependency tree have to be explicitly valued, the other assets would 
have the ‘accumulated value’ (which is defined as the highest value among it and 
any ones above). For example, assume that the actor “company ECMA” has a 
goal “provide payment by credit card service” which is an asset, and constrained 
by the Security Constraint “Keep data confidentiality”, so that it is also related to 
the softgoal “confidentiality”, and the Security Constraint is assigned an ‘asset 
value’ of 7. This asset depends on the secure resource “web-server-SSL” (which 
is also an asset), due to the relations of the meta-model that implies the “web-
server-SSL” ‘asset value’ will be at least 7 (the accumulated value) according to 
the risk assessment methodology we followed (Magerit [12]).  
 
 
Fig.  2 Extension to SEAM (‘SEAM-SPL’) 
                                                 
1
 Asset: Anything that has value to the organization (ISO/IEC 13335)  
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In order to manage the variability of the SPL and the instantiated applications 
from the SPL at the level of a particular Actor, we extended the SEGM of Secure 
Tropos. The extension shown in Fig.  3 consists of adding an entity named 
‘Variation’ which could have as value: ‘common’, ‘optional’ or ‘alternative’, and 
which is related to the entities Goal, Security Constraint, Plan and Resource by 
means of a relationship ‘is part of’ and which an Actor could have several 
Variation. It represents the variation object and defines a concrete type of 
variation (‘‘how does it vary?”). 
The starting points of the variability modeling according to our proposed 
process in next section are the goals and next secure goals, because if the 
variability and traceability links are carefully established, they allow us to decide 
what security goals are needed to maintain the security aligned with the goals of 
the SPL or product/application and what the optimal set of security constrains of a 
determined priority according to the security risks is in the context of the different 
scenarios of the SPL that provides the rationale for the selection. This therefore 
supposes a rise in the abstraction level of the variations or variants selection 
process, and the selection is made in the requirements level rather than in the 
design level. 
Finally, with the aim of providing a security risk criterion during the security 
requirements engineering in SPL engineering at the level of a particular Actor, we 
have also added a new entity: ‘Threat’, which has as attributes (according to the 
Magerit [12]): ‘Degradation’, ‘Likelihood’, ‘Impact’ and ‘Risk’. We use the 
definition of threat as a potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result 
in harm to a system or organization [9]. Hence, the assets are exposed to threats 
which may prevent the security goals from being achieved. In a SPL, not all 
threats affect all assets nor all their security goals, so those which are common 
and optional have to be identified. To calculate the ‘impact’ of each threat on the 
assets, the asset values of each security constraint along with the ‘degradation’ 
caused by the threat on the assets (which must be estimated by the security risk 
expert within a range from 0 to 100%) are taken into account (Impact = 
round(accumulated value x degradation)). The impact and the ‘likelihood’ of 
occurrence or rate of occurrence of the threat (which must be also estimated by 
the security risk expert) are taken into account in order to calculate the ‘risk’ 
according to a defined formula in Magerit (ℜ(Vi, Fj) = Vi+j-n)) [‘R’ is risk, ‘V’ is asset 
value, ‘F’ is likelihood]. The risk
2
 is then classified in a range of 0 to 5 (according 
to the Magerit [12] scale). So that any estimation of impact and risk are 
“potential” if no ‘secure plans’ are deployed. 
 
                                                 
2
 Risk is an estimate of the degree of exposure to threat to one or more assets causing damage or prejudice to the organization 
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Fig.  3 Extension to SEGM (‘SEGM-SPL’) 
 
4.4. Secure Tropos Process Extension 
‘Secure Tropos – SPL’ process is an iterative and incremental process, which is 
an add-in of activities and tasks that can be incorporated into and tailored to an 
organization’s SPL development process model to provide it with a security 
requirements engineering approach. It can therefore be termed as a scalable 
process since not all the tasks and steps are required, and developers could create 
their own lightweight process by selecting a subset of the steps in each task. We 
have defined the key tasks that must be part of each SPL activity, signifying that 
the order in which the steps are performed depends on the particular process that 
is established in an organization. The activities and their tasks can thus be 
combined with existing development methods. 
We have specified these new tasks and activities of the process using the OMG 
standard SPEM 2.0 [20]. SPEM is a process meta-model which is used to describe 
a concrete software development process or a family of related software 
development process. The SPEM specification is structured as a UML profile, and 
provides a complete MOF-based meta-model. This meta-process modelling is a 
type of metamodelling used in software engineering to support the effort of 
creating flexible process models. The purpose of using process models, and in this 
case SPEM, is to document and communicate the ‘Secure Tropos – SPL’ process, 
to enhance its reuse and to facilitate its integration into other processes and 
frameworks. Thus, by using SPEM in the ‘Secure Tropos – SPL’ specification we 
promote the increment of process engineers’ productivity and the quality of the 
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global models they produce as a result of the integration of ‘Secure Tropos – SPL’ 
into the process map of their organization or company. 
In accordance with SPEM, SREPPLine is described by using the structure 
shown in Fig. 4. Each activity specifies: WorkProduct as both input and output 
respectively; the roles that perform or participate in this RoleUse activity; the 
collection of Steps defined for a Task Use that represents all the work that should 
be carried out to achieve the overall development goal of the Activity; and the 
Guidance that specifies the practices, techniques or standards to consider when 
performing the Task Use. 
 
 
Fig. 4 'Secure Tropos - SPL' structure using SPEM 2.0 
 
As shown in Fig. 1 and in Fig. 5, ‘Secure Tropos – SPL’ is composed of two 
activities: the Secure Tropos Domain Requirements Engineering (STDReq) 
activity (A1) and the Secure Tropos Application Requirements Engineering 
(STAReq) activity (A2). 
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Fig. 5 ‘Secure Tropos – SPL’ process overview 
 
4.4.1. Secure Tropos Domain Requirements Engineering – 
(STDReq) 
The main aim of this activity is the development of common and variable 
security requirements and related security artefacts of the SPL. The details of this 
activity are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1  STDReq activity specified with SPEM (OMG) 
TaskUse: A1.1 - Security Analysis of Software Product Line 
Environment
ProcessPerformer {kind: primary}
RoleUse: Product line manager {kind: in}
RoleUse: Business domain experts {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security requirements engineer {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security expert {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security architect {kind: in}
RoleUse: Inspection team {kind: in}
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: in}
WorkProductUse: Stakeholder needs
WorkProductUse: Existing products of the domain
WorkProductUse: Business goals
WorkProductUse: Goal model (Tropos)
WorkProductUse: Organisation security policy
WorkProductUse: Law and regulations
WorkProductUse: Requests for additional / altered security 
constrains
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: out}
WorkProductUse: List of common goals of the SPL {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Actor Diagram of the SPL –
‘SEAM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Goal Diagram of the SPL –
‘SEGM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Table with the Security Risks of the SPL {state: 
initial}
Steps 
Step: A1.1.1 SPL stakeholders scoping
Step: A1.1.1.1 Identify common actors of the SPL
Step: A1.1.1.2 Analyze the requests for additional / 
altered common goals
Step: A1.1.2 SPL security constrains analysis
Step: A1.1.2.1 Identify common goals
Step: A1.1.2.2 Identify security constrains
Step: A1.1.2.3 Security constraint modelling
Step: A1.1.3 SPL secure entities analysis
Step: A1.1.3.1 Identify security considerations imposed by 
the environment of the SPL
Step: A1.1.3.2 SPL secure entities and secure capability 
modelling
Step: A1.1.4 Security risk scoping
Step: A1.1.4.1 Common assets valuation
Step: A1.1.4.2 Common threats identification and 
calculation of degradation, likelihood and 
impact of each threat
Step: A1.1.4.3 Common risks assessment
Step: A1.1.4.4 Perform a security balance analysis of
the SPL
Step: A1.1.5 Inspect ‘SEAM-SPL’ and ‘SEGM-SPL’ models
Guidance
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Questionnaire
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Interviews
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Meetings
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Application goals matrix
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Security constraint modelling (Secure 
Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure entities modelling (Secure 
Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure capability modelling (Secure 
Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Checklist}: Organization policy, laws and standards
Activity {kind = Phase}: Domain Requirements Engineering
Process: Secure Tropos – SPL
Activity {kind = Iteration}: Secure Tropos Domain 
Requirements Engineering (STDReq) – (A1)
TaskUse: A1.2 - Security Analysis of Software Product Line 
ProcessPerformer {kind: primary}
RoleUse: Product line manager {kind: in}
RoleUse: Business domain experts {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security requirements engineer {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security expert {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security architect {kind: in}
RoleUse: Inspection team {kind: in}
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: in}
WorkProductUse: Stakeholder needs of each variant
WorkProductUse: ‘SEAM-SPL’
WorkProductUse: ‘SEGM-SPL’
WorkProductUse: Organisation security policy for each variant
WorkProductUse: Law and regulations for each variant
WorkProductUse: Requests for variant goals & security goals
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: out}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Actor Diagram of the SPL 
– ‘SEAM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Goal Diagram of the SPL 
– ‘SEGM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Table with the Security Risks of all the 
variants of the SPL {state: initial}
Steps 
Step: A1.1.1 SPL variants analysis
Step: A1.1.1.1 Identify and model actors which are variants 
Step: A1.1.1.2 Analyze the requests for variant goals & 
security goals
Step: A1.1.2 SPL variants security constrains analysis
Step: A1.1.2.1 Identify and model variant goals
Step: A1.1.2.2 Identify variant security constrains for each goal
Step: A1.1.2.3 Security constraint variability modelling
Step: A1.1.3 SPL variants secure entities analysis
Step: A1.1.3.1 Identify security considerations imposed by 
each variant of the SPL
Step: A1.1.3.2 SPL secure entities variability and secure 
capability modelling
Step: A1.1.4 SPL Security risk scoping
Step: A1.1.4.1 Variant assets valuation
Step: A1.1.4.2 Variant threats identification and 
calculation of degradation, likelihood and 
impact of each threat
Step: A1.1.4.3 SPL risks assessment (common & variant 
elements)
Step: A1.1.4.4 Perform a security balance analysis of 
all the variants of the SPL
Step: A1.1.5 Inspect ‘SEAM-SPL’ and ‘SEGM-SPL’ models
Guidance
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Questionnaire
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Interviews
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Meetings
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Application goals matrix
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Security constraint modelling (Secure Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure entities modelling (Secure Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure capability modelling (Secure Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Checklist}: Organization policy, laws and standards
Activity {kind = Phase}: Domain Requirements Engineering
Process: Secure Tropos – SPL
Activity {kind = Iteration}: Secure Tropos Domain 
Requirements Engineering (STDReq) – (A1)
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4.4.2. Secure Tropos Application Requirements Engineering – 
(STAReq) 
The main aim of this activity is the elicitation and documentation of the 
security requirements and their related security artefacts in the SPL application 
and reusing the security domain artefacts and requirements as far as possible. The 
details of this activity are depicted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 STAReq activity specified with SPEM (OMG) 
TaskUse: A2.1 - Security Analysis of System / Application 
Environment
ProcessPerformer {kind: primary}
RoleUse: Product line manager {kind: in}
RoleUse: Expert users {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security requirements engineer {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security expert {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security architect {kind: in}
RoleUse: Inspection team {kind: in}
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: in}
WorkProductUse: Stakeholders of the application needs
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Actor Diagram of the SPL –
‘SEAM-SPL’
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Goal Diagram of the SPL –
‘SEGM-SPL’
WorkProductUse: Application specific environment, policies and 
regulations
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: out}
WorkProductUse: List of common goals of the SPL {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Actor Diagram of the 
Application – ‘SEAM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Goal Diagram of the 
Application – ‘SEGM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Application’s stakeholder goals that do not 
correspond to domain goals {state: initial}
Steps 
Step: A2.1.1 Variability exploitation and instantation
Step: A2.1.1.1 Define security goals of the application
Step: A2.1.1.2 Communicate the relevant variants to the 
stakeholders of the application
Step: A2.1.1.3 Inherit common variants and analyze 
alternative and optional variants 
Step: A2.1.1.4 Select the appropriate variants and model 
the chosen variants: security constraint 
modelling, secure entities modelling and 
secure capability modelling
Step: A2.1.1.4 Collect the application’s stakeholder goals 
that do not correspond to domain goals
Guidance
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Interviews
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Meetings
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Security constraint modelling (Secure 
Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure entities modelling (Secure 
Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure capability modelling (Secure 
Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Checklist}:  Application specific policy, laws and 
standards
Activity {kind = Phase}: Domain Requirements Engineering
Process: Secure Tropos – SPL
Activity {kind = Iteration}: Secure Tropos Domain 
Requirements Engineering (STDReq) – (A2)
TaskUse: A2.2 - Security Analysis of System / Application
ProcessPerformer {kind: primary}
RoleUse: Product line manager {kind: in}
RoleUse: Business domain experts {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security requirements engineer {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security expert {kind: in}
RoleUse: Security architect {kind: in}
RoleUse: Inspection team {kind: in}
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: in}
WorkProductUse: Stakeholder needs of each variant
WorkProductUse: ‘SEAM-SPL’ of the application 
WorkProductUse: ‘SEGM-SPL’ of the application 
WorkProductUse: Organisation security policy for each variant
WorkProductUse: Law and regulations for each variant
WorkProductUse: Requests for variant goals & security goals
WorkDefinitionParameter {kind: out}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Actor Diagram of the 
application – ‘SEAM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Security Enhanced Goal Diagram of the 
application – ‘SEGM-SPL’ {state: initial}
WorkProductUse: Table with the Security Risks of  the 
application {state: initial}
Steps 
Step: A2.1.1 Sec-deltas analysis
Step: A1.1.1.1 Identify sec-deltas
Step: A2.1.2 System/application security constrains analysis
Step: A1.1.2.1 Application security constraint variability 
modelling
Step: A2.1.3 System/application secure entities analysis
Step: A1.1.3.1 Identify security considerations imposed by 
the needs of the application 
Step: A1.1.3.2 SPL Application secure entities variability and 
secure capability modelling
Step: A2.1.4 System/application security risk scoping
Step: A1.1.4.1 Application assets valuation
Step: A1.1.4.2 Application threats identification and 
calculation of degradation, likelihood and 
impact of each threat
Step: A1.1.4.3 Application risks assessment
Step: A1.1.4.4 Perform a security balance analysis of 
the application
Step: A2.1.5 Inspect ‘SEAM-SPL’ and ‘SEGM-SPL’ models of the 
application
Guidance
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Interviews
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Meetings
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Security constraint modelling (Secure Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure entities modelling (Secure Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Practice}: Secure capability modelling (Secure Tropos)
Guidance {kind: Checklist}: Application specific policy, laws and 
standards
Activity {kind = Phase}: Application Requirements Engineering
Process: Secure Tropos – SPL
Activity {kind = Iteration}: Secure Tropos Application
Requirements Engineering (STAReq) – (A2)
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5. Example of application  
A simple and short example related to health and social care SPL is outlined in 
this section in order to describe and show throughout the example the applicability 
of our proposed extension of Secure Tropos for SPL engineering (named ‘Secure 
Tropos – SPL’).  
Details of the organization in which the case study presented herein was carried 
out will not be provided for reasons of confidentiality and the potential threat to 
its security as well as security technical details related to the project. Moreover, 
all the information regarding the information systems mentioned in this case study 
have been previously published in various public forums. 
We will apply our approach to specify the security requirements of a software 
product line of a CRM (Customer Relationship Management) system, which may 
have several different configurations for three different public institutions of the 
public social security system of Spain. Therefore, we will characterize the system, 
named eCRM, as a SPL whose members vary by system configuration yet retain 
the same core functionalities. Obviously, this case study has to be simplified and 
summed up to enable points of our approach to be easily illustrated in this paper. 
Graphically, as shown in Fig.  6, Fig.  7 and Fig.  8, in the SEAD (Security 
Enhanced Actor Diagram) and SEGD (Security Enhanced Goal Diagram) the 
‘Variability Dependencies’ are represented with ‘◄V’ over the dependency that 
joins the entities, so that the tip of the triangle indicates the “owner” of the 
variant, i.e. ‘Depender’ or ‘Dependee’. In addition, if an entity is a ‘Variation’, it 
is depicted with a ‘(V)’ within the representation of the entity. The Secure Tropos 
entities are represented in the figures as follow: an actor with a circle; a goal with 
rounded rectangle; a security constraint with an octagon; a plan with a hexagon; a 
resource with a rectangle; and a threat with a pentagon. 
 
Fig.  6 Part of the SEAD of eCRM (SPL) – (Late Requirements phase) 
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Fig.  7 Part of the SEAD of the instantiated applications of the eCRM (SPL) – (Late Requirements phase) 
Fig.  6 shows a SEAD at the Late Requirements phase, which identifies and 
analyses the actors of the SPL and its environment. It also models the SPL’s 
business goals, at business and service level, as well as it illustrates the analysis of 
the variability dependencies of these goals. This means that it supports the 
modeling of the variability of the goals, specifying the variant goals as common, 
optional or alternative. As shown in Fig.  7, the actor ‘eCRM (SPL)’ has strategic 
goals and intentions. In this example, the ‘eCRM (SPL)’ has a common service 
goal to citizens: “Provide general information about social security issues” and 
two optional service goals: “Provide the status of a citizen’s benefit” and/or 
“Manage the allocation account contribution to the Social Security”. In order to 
deal with the security issues, security constrains are introduced along with the 
variability dependencies. Security constrains, such as those shown in the model 
(“Keep data available”, “Keep financial data privacy” and “Keep benefit data 
privacy”), represent restrictions related to security that the SPL must have and 
instantiated products must respect. 
Fig.  7 illustrates a SEAD at the Late Requirements phase, which models the 
instantiation of applications from a SPL. In particular, the model represents two 
applications (eCRM-I and eCRM-II) instantiated from ‘eCRM (SPL)’, both of 
which inherit the common goals, constraints, plans and resources. Each 
application inherits the common business goals from the SPL and the stakeholders 
of each application choose the optional business goals by exploiting the variability 
of the eCRM(SPL). 
Furthermore, the SEGD shown in Fig.  8 allows a deeper understanding of how 
the SPL reason about goals to be fulfilled, plans to be performed and availability 
of resources. It completes the SEAD with the reasoning that each actor makes 
about its internal goals and constraints, plans and resources. It can be seen that 
each variant business goal, which is restricted by a constraint, has related secure 
goals, which satisfy the constraint by means of secure plans that need resources. 
Finally, through the entity ‘Variation’ of the SEGM it is possible to trace the 
entities which are part of an instantiated application from the SPL. Hence, by 
means of this entity of the SEGM we can identify that for the instantiated 
application eCRM-I, the secure variant entities that are part of it are: the resource 
‘Benefit database’; the secure goals ‘System privacy ensured’ and ‘User 
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authenticity ensured’; the secure plans related to these secure goals ‘Crypto 
protocol’ and ‘User authentication’. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
A large number of goal-oriented requirements engineering approaches have 
been proposed in the literature, which focus on eliciting security requirements. 
However, most of these approaches provide little help as how security 
requirements can be elicited and modelled in the context of SPL, at both the social 
and technical dimension, along with the fact that many standard requirements 
engineering practices must also be appropriately tailored to the specific demands 
of SPL [3].  
This paper introduces the foundations of an approach that fills this gap by 
proposing SecureTropos-SPL, an extension to Secure Tropos to support SPL. The 
contribution of this work is that of: explaining how SPL concepts are aligned with 
Secure Tropos concepts; the presentation of a risk-driven goal-based process as a 
redefinition of the Secure Tropos process for SPL engineering; and an extension 
of Secure Tropos metamodel and language to support ‘variability’ modelling and 
‘risk’ elements. Hence, by means of this approach it is possible to elicitate and to 
analyze both social and technical security requirements from the early stages of 
the SPL development process based on security goals and following a security 
risk criterion. 
As future work, we plan to provide appropriate tool support to our approach. 
This will enable us to apply our work to large and complex case studies and 
explore its integration with relevant design-level proposals (such as UMLSec in 
[18]) to facilitate the secure design of SPL. 
Fig.  8 Part of the SEGD of eCRM(SPL) - (Late Requirements phase) 
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